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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to explore what potential that the concept of
'inoperativity' has in the philosophy and theory of education. I will discuss the method of
critique used which aims to think through the problems in existing theory rather than
discard good thinking when problems are found. The strengths and weaknesses of
deschooling and democratic approaches will be at the center of this critique. As a
response to the weaknesses of both, the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, focusing on
the way that interiority and enjoyment are essential concepts for the philosophy of
education, as well as Giorgio Agamben, the philosopher of form-of-life, will be analyzed,
demonstrating that we might find something vitally important in an inoperative
understanding of concepts like study and and school.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Seventeenth century wandering haiku poet Matsuo Basho (1998) opened his most
famous travelog with the following lines:
The moon and sun are eternal travelers. Even the years wander on. A lifetime
adrift in a boat, or in old age leading a tired horse into the years, every day is a
journey, and the journey itself is home. From the earliest times there have always
been some who perished along the road. Still I have been drawn by wind blown
clouds into dreams of a lifetime of wandering. (pg. 3)
These lines will serve as a poetic description that might make more clear the
theoretical and conceptual terminology at the heart of this thesis. Basho, here, is invoking
a not wholly uncommon belief that the journey is more important than the destination. In
fact, he goes one step further, asserting that the journey and the destination have moved
into a zone of indistinction: ‘the journey itself is home.’ ‘A lifetime of wandering’ then,
to put it into a teleological framework, is precisely a life in which the means of living
never culminate in an end, or, as Giorgio Agamben (2000) might state it it, Basho’s formof-life can only be formulated as pure means-without-end.
Origins
A troubling thought that serves as the impetus for this project is that although
fostering ‘critical thinking’ appears to be a universal objective among educators, schools
as a whole may be the greatest contributors to anti-intellectualism and uncritical thought
in the world today. This is a broad claim that will require careful argument. And while
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the purpose of this thesis is not to analyze ‘critical thinking,’ per-se, this work does seek
to probe and rediscover what it means to educate and be educated, to understand why
many like myself often feel totally unsatisfied with the the system of formal education as
it is organized in the United States, which is only corroborated by the fact that a great
number of young students report losing interest in school before leaving the elementary
grades (Raab, 2017).
A fundamental component to any inquiry regarding education is school and it
must be clear that school and education, though closely related, are not synonymous
terms. Fundamentally, school purports to be a place, among others, where education
takes place. It is from this perspective that the following inquiry will approach concerns
in schooling and education in general.
My inquiry is grounded by the following concerns and objectives. First, I want to
attempt to discover if it has been the case that, as scholars have attempted to re-theorize
the grounds for schooling itself, they have missed key insights of certain thinkers due to
the adoption of common philosophical truths about life that reach back to antiquity when
proposing schooling reforms and revolutions. Second, I am interested in exploring the
ways that two important critics of western metaphysics–Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio
Agamben–can help us approach key philosophical debates about schooling and the
purpose of education in a way that breaks us free from ingrained modes of thinking and
reveals an entirely new way of conceptualizing what education is for individuals and
society.
The third objective is to demonstrate why I believe that we need teachers and
schools that are highly resistant to the worst forces of, and changes in, state and federal
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policy, whatever they be, rather focusing our energy on endless attacks of schooling that
are unlikely to lead to a genuine movement toward deschooling.
Ultimately, it will be shown, both deschooling and education for democracy fail
because they both maintain, in their own way, that the primary role of students is to serve
a greater social function. As will be shown, this thinking cedes too much ground to forces
which would make education an endeavor that always has determinative and operative
ends rather than something that is inherently enjoyable for the human being in itself.
As a practicing educator in the K-12 system, it is nothing short of frustrating
when I am put in a position where I need to tell a student that there should be no hurry
when doing close reading, that reading a poem or a passage from an important text should
be more like having a long, pleasant conversation with a friend than a race to the finish
line, yet ultimately know that I am never able, as a teacher, to truly give them sufficient
time to contemplate, wrestle with, and enjoy what they are reading.
Real Utopias
In the domain of alternative education, some have argued that we should pursue
‘real utopias’ (McGregor & Mills, 2011) when thinking about what schools could look
like. While the idea of utopia is certainly problematic, real-utopias as a concept points to
a hope in long lasting alternatives while remaining cognizant of actual, real-world
potential and problems, leading to what I classify as utopian-realist in its critical
approach. To bring the utopian-realist approach into the light, a metaphor supplied by the
messianic philosopher and cultural critic Walter Benjamin (1990) perfectly describes this
vision. In a short piece, Benjamin describes the hasidic vision of a messianic world to
come:
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Everything there will be arranged just as it is with us. The room we have now will
be just the same in the world to come; where our child lies sleeping, it will sleep in the
world to come. The clothes we are wearing we shall also wear in the next world.
Everything will be the same as here-only a little bit different (pg. 664).
Following Benjamin, the ideal pursued for schooling and education in this work is
not a radical upheaval of every bit of the school system with the hope of eliminating all
structures of power; instead, it is pursued with the conviction the future, though mostly
the same, need only be ‘a little bit different.’
Critique and Critical Thinking
Before advancing to the central argument, it is worth considering how, according
to existing scholarship, schools might make themselves into real utopias and interesting
work has been done highlighting the value of critique as a practice. Critique, according to
Olsen’s (2006) understanding of Kant and Foucault, is argued to be vital in the maturing
process of individuals. Maturity, in this sense, does not require docility but instead is an
“attitude toward ourselves and the present through a historical analysis of the limits, and
the possibility of transgression, of going beyond” (pg. 246). The historical limits are
precisely the structures of social discipline that define our possibilities. Maturity then
recognizes the structural limit, but instead of being constrained by the limit, Foucault
stresses that maturity requires transgression. The transgression in this case is specific; it
comes from the will to go beyond. Transgression and deviance ought to be used
synonymously so we might again see certain deviant or transgressive attitudes as an asset
rather than a deficit. Though we might not expect students to reach full maturity in
school, Foucault’s tool for moving toward this maturity, for thinking beyond present
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possibilities, is critique (Olsen, 2006). Here it becomes possible to better distinguish
between critical thinking and critique. Critical thinking connotes an analytical process of
differentiation, categorization, and high level problem solving and can be trained to
students methodically. Critique, on the other hand, refuses the position of docility
expected through training rituals and discipline and “performs a function of challenging
conventional authority” (Olsen, 2006, p. 257). The work of critique is to point out that
conventional authority is a historical inheritance and is not necessarily the way things
have to be (Foucault, 1977). In order to point out the historical basis for reality, that
things do not have to be as they are, requires a type of thinking which a good education
should prepare and expect students to do.
Schools that focus on engaging students in the practice of critique, then, would
have to reformulate the way that students approach knowledge. Considering two types of
knowledge discussed in Foucault’s writing, Mavelli (2014) demonstrates how schooling
privileges types of knowledge that are instrumental rather than transformative.
Instrumental knowledge, presuming that all knowledge must produce something, always
operates within a framework of discipline, where the objective is “to increase the possible
utility of individuals” (Foucault, 1977, p. 210). Transformative knowledge, on the other
hand, requires “a progress of transfiguration of the self” (Mavelli, 2014, p. 861) rather
than skill acquisition. In this model, if schools are to really make a difference for such
students, they need to present students with a type of knowledge that makes possible the
reconstruction of the self at a deeper level. Unfortunately, typical models reduce calls for
justice and transformation to an “economic imperative” (Mavelli, 2014, pp. 863-4).
Instead of insisting that students in schools learn practical skills, showing students in
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what way education may be transformative, and providing them with the tools for
meaningful critique, would be a significant opportunity for important change in formal
education.
By removing the instrumental nature of schooling, schools might become a space
for student transcendence and revelation “encompassed [by] an ethics of the care of the
self” (Mavelli, 2014, p. 867). While this proposition asks for significant movement away
from current practices and assumptions about the purpose of education, it does not
require a seismic shift.
Instrumental or Inoperative
Critique, as discussed above, opposes critical thinking on the grounds of
instrumental value. This distinction provides only a starting point for the analysis that is
to come. Form-of-life, which is the central concept in the coming analysis, is certainly
anti-instrumentalist, but can not be understood as transformative either in the sense
described above, because transformation itself then becomes an end to be achieved.
Form-of-life is living like a “wind blown cloud,” (Basho, 1998, pg. 3) where even the
idea of being transformed is left behind. From this point of view, all activities are
rendered inoperative—non-instrumental.
In pursuing this utopian-realist approach, a theory of education that centers the
inoperative instead of the instrumental is essential for thinking through how a future
might be mostly the same, but ‘a little different’ without ever being able to say what this
future might look like and refusing to even define it as a goal in itself, because it can
spontaneously arrive in any given moment as Levinas (1969) points out when he states
against the traditional view of the end of the world that the escatological is simply found
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in “being beyond the totality” (pg. 22), beyond the totalizing, historical reduction of
beings to mere ends. This claim is founded on and will be supported throughout all
chapters primarily using the philosophy of form-of-life developed by Giorgio Agamben
(2000; 2013; 2017; 2019). The fourth chapter will be dedicated mostly to the work of
Emmanuel Levinas (1969) in order to help clarify difficulties in understanding
Agamben. The second and third chapters will develop critiques of the work of Ivan Illich
(1970) and Amy Gutmann (1987) respectively. The fifth chapter will bring everything
together and clarify the importance of Agamben when discussing education. A short
conclusion will then follow, outlining larger implications of this study, and pointing
toward potential for future study and research.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM WITH SCHOOL
Preliminary Thoughts
Because school is a key social structure that nearly all individuals in developed
nations experience and likely support, any meaningful critique of schooling runs the risk
of being silenced. This is unfortunately what happened to Ivan Illich (Gabbard, 2020)
who spent his life defending education and quality thinking against the values of
consumerism, authoritarianism, and social reproduction which are so central to the school
experience. A principle fueling this thesis is that the most important thinking in this
world is always at risk of saying something that will be silenced. The following analysis
risks offending predominant thinking about school. It also, as will become clear, runs the
risk of offending the critics of school as well.
The central thesis of Illich’s (1970) seminal work, Deschooling Society, is this:
“All over the world the school has an anti-educational effect on society” (pg. 8). Though
Illich is never perfectly clear in his definition of education, a succinct summary of his
thought on the issue is provided by Gabbard (2020): “Education is conceptualized as an
authentically human value that emerges from the authentically human need to learn.” (pg.
38). While the principle goal of this chapter is to confront issues in the thinking of Ivan
Illich, the reason that this is done is not to discredit him, but, hopefully instead, to move
forward the dialogue that he opened when he published Deschooling Society. The reasons
for moving this dialogue forward are twofold: first, because what he had to say in the
early 70s is still relevant today and second, if educators continue to fail to take his
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critique of school seriously, we stand little chance of creating opportunities for
meaningful educational experiences. Afterall, though his name rarely appears on
reference lists, the sort of thinking regarding the institutional abuses that schooling
performs which he inaugurated fifty years ago persists among a subset of educational
theorists today. Many theorists still remain concerned with themes that were of a concern
of Illich. Many begin with a focus on schools as institutions designed to control, punish,
and discipline young people (Chomsky, 2011; Gabbard, 2011; Giroux, 2011; Lack, 2011;
Saltman, 2011; Scapp, 2011) while others share Illich’s concern that schools serve to sort
students and reproduce a stratified, unequal society (Alquist, 2011; Books, 2011; Brown,
2011; Giroux, 2020; Gorski, 2011; Jackson, 2011; Keown-Bomar & Pattee, 2011).
Ritual and the Institution of School
Illich is very intentional in separating school from education. As mentioned
above, education is a human good related to exploration and the natural desire to learn
new things. Further, the root of the word education is ‘educe,’ which means to “bring
out” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), signaling the potential for something new to emerge
through the process of education. According to Illich (1970), modern schools, on the
other hand, are man made institutions that group individuals according to their age,
assign teachers to these groups of pupils, and require full-time, compulsory attendance.
Because schools serve an institutional function, their reason for existence is not
necessarily education. Moreso, Illich lays out how education is actively stifled in schools.
Ultimately, the reason for his concern about schools is precisely that “the school system
today performs the threefold function common to powerful churches throughout history.
It is simultaneously the repository of society’s myth, the institutionalization of that
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myth’s contradictions, and the locus of the ritual which reproduces and veils the
disparities between myth and reality.” (pg. 37). Illich spends the entirety of Chapter 3,
“Ritualization of Progress” critiquing the social myths that school reproduces. The
contention of this paper is not that his critique is off base. The critique of the various
myths that schools promote and support–The Myth of Institutionalized Values, The Myth
of Measurement of Values, The Myth of Packaging of Values,and The Myth of Self
Perpetuating Progress—is entirely justified. The big question driving this inquiry is,
instead, does the conclusion that the only way forward is the elimination of schooling
follow from the critique?
Taking the criticism that schooling is the institutional replacement of the Church,
the exploration of this question will be supported primarily by the work done by Giorgio
Agamben (2013) who, in The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, shows
how the unique form-of-life developed by monastics, and exemplified by the Franciscans,
was a life that was lived totally outside the institutionally structured values of the Church.
What is essential to consider in the context of this study is that these monastics lived
according to their Rule without ever needing or desiring to reject the Church itself. In this
way, their approach seems definitively different from the deschooling approach and
further exploration is required to determine what we can take from this. Illich (1970)
claims that “neither ideological criticism nor social action can bring about a new society.
Only disenchantment with and detachment from social ritual and reform of that ritual can
bring about radical change” (pg. 38) but it is unclear whether he has considered all the
variations of ‘reform’ that are possible to bring about a ‘radical change’ because he
quickly states, after claiming that Universities traditionally were formed around
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education and making a life of scholarship, but have since decayed as they adopted the
Myths of Measurement of Values and Self Perpetuating Progress. Without much
qualification, he states: “only a generation which grows up without obligatory schools
will be able to recreate the university” (pg. 38). Why this is so for Illich is not entirely
clear but it should be noted that this is the type of pessimistic view that cannot be easily
argued against since it would require the elimination of institutions in order to verify its
conclusion. Fortunately for this study, the history of the Franciscan movement can be of
some help.
What is at stake here is the relationship between the legal institutional system of
schooling and the possibility of education. Illich’s (1970) presumption is that the
presence of the former cancels out the potential for the latter. Fortunately, Illich himself
has already, through the analogy of school as the new Church, opened the door through
which this critique will enter.
Francis and the early adherents of the movement that he founded existed in a
space at odds with the Church but never sought to be separate from the authority from the
Church. Agamben (2013) goes to great lengths to demonstrate this point. Central to
understanding the relationship between Francis and the Church is the particular position
taken up by priests which is totally different from the life lived by the Friars Minor, who
also take up a different form than the monastics that preceded them. In order to
understand the Franciscans we have to understand the history and role of liturgy in the
church.
Originally developed in a monastic setting with the intention of directing the
entire life of the monk to a specific form with the Rule that monks followed “assimilated
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to the rules of an art rather than to a legal apparatus” (pg 32) creating a liturgy of life.
Further, as Agamben notes, “the monastery is perhaps the first place in which life itself–
and not only the ascetic techniques that form and regulate it—was presented as an art”
(pg. 33). This liturgy as a form of life was later assimilated by the clergy and codified
into the legal apparatus, which it initially had resisted. The emergence of liturgy in the
sphere of law presented a major problem that Francis unwittingly appeared, for
Agamben, to resolve. As he writes, in time “cenoby [monastic profession] appears as a
field of forces run through by two opposing tendencies–at once to resolve life into a
liturgy, and pulling in the other direction, to transform liturgy into life” (pg. 86). By this
he is trying to demonstrate an unresolved paradox between the draw to a life that follows
legalistically a liturgy set out for it and a liturgy that can not help but become life. With
this paradox unresolved the monastic is assimilated into the legal order in much the same
way that educators within schools, for Illich (1970), are assimilated into the power
structure of the state and become modern clerics, themselves performing the liturgy of
“open-ended consumption” (pg. 43) of knowledge. And because the investigation is not
allowed to progress beyond this problem it is no wonder that the statement such: “school
seems eminently suited to be the World Church of our decaying culture” (pg. 43) can
only be read with pessimism.
Agamben (2013), though, sees in the early Franciscans a resolution to this
problem that other monastic orders failed at. Teachers and educators, following the
metaphor, though currently performing the clerical role in the new World Church (Illich,
1970), can take up a form-of-life that is removed from the legal apparatus. The solution,
for the Franciscans, had nothing to do with the elimination of the clergy or the Church, or
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even outright rebellion. Agamben (2013) notes that in Francis’ own writing there was an
absolute deference to priests and clergy, and this is key:
Francis defines priests as ‘those who live according to the form of the holy
Roman Church,’ and it is clear that The Testament [a writing of Francis] distinguishes
explicitly and firmly between the two forms of life. On the one hand Francis declares that
the Lord has given him ‘such faith’ in the priests who live ‘according to the form of the
Roman Church’ that even if they were to persecute him (it is significant that this
possibility would be contemplated), he would fear, love, and honor them as his lords. On
the other hand, he takes care to specify that ‘after the Lord gave me brothers, no one
showed me what I should do, but the Most High Himself revealed to me that I should live
according to the form of the Holy Gospel’ (pg. 97).
This is exactly what is missing in Illich’s (1970) critique of school. Illich, in
comparing the institution of schooling to the Church, can only see the possibility of living
according to the form of the institution, failing to recognize that although the institution
has developed its own form, to live a life in the form of the wandering scholar (Illich,
1993) is still an option that has potential even without having to eliminate schools all
together.
My own reading of Illich suggests that he is not far from this position, but that he,
for whatever reason, could not bring himself all the way there. Critique of institutions is
easy because it can go on forever and always reinforce itself. But he does, likely without
realizing it, suggest something beyond the critique, something that can be done. He
writes: “each of us is personally responsible for his or her own deschooling, and only we
have the power to do it. No one can be excused if he fails to liberate himself from
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schooling.” (pp. 47-8). If we take schooling to be a mindset, which these sentences
clearly presume; deschooling here is presented as a type of deprograming. It has less to
do with the repurposing or destruction of buildings but of the elimination of a certain way
of being that school expects–i.e. instrumentalized and operative being.
The Franciscans had the same problem. This movement was a dechurching
movement, though, instead of deschooling. What is unique is that, as demonstrated by
Francis’ approach to obedience to the authority of the priests, he “kn0ws none of the
‘anticlericalism’ that is so characteristic of many spiritual movements that are
contemporary with him. He can always give to the Church what is the Church’s without
polemic, namely the administration of the officium that belongs to it” (Agamben, 2013,
pg. 120) Note that although Agamben is referring here to 13th century anticlericalism, it
should be clear that this is no different from the anticlerical gestures of Illich.
Why is Francis able to affirm subjection to the clergy and Church without issue?
It is precisely because he recognizes “the radical heterogeneity of the two forms of life”
(Agamben, 2013, pp. 120-1). Agamben calls this “radical extraneousness to law and
liturgy” (pg. 121) distinguishinng between life according to law and liturgy (clergy) and
life according to the Gospel of Christ (Francis). In other words, “life according to the
form of the holy Gospel is situated on a level that is so distinct from that of the life
according to the form of the holy Roman Church that it can not enter into conflict with it”
(pg. 122). This entirely distinct level is what Agamben refers to as form-of-life
(hyphenated), which is distinct from any other generic form of life (unhyphenated).
Chapter Five will more fully develop the concept of form-of-life and the necessity of its
application to education, but for the sake of the conversation about Illich it is important to
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point out that the complete radical move that Francis performs in no way demands a
complete restructuring of existing legal and political institutions, namely schools and
Universities. What is being proposed here is identical to Agamben’s definition of the
fundamental uniqueness of Franciscanism: that is, an “attempt to realize a human life and
practice absolutely outside the determinations of the law.” (pg. 110) This life is form-oflife. Everything remains mostly the same, only a little different. But it is through that
little difference that everything changes.
Potential and Act
In the second paragraph of chapter four of Deschooling Society, Illich (1970) lays
out the criteria that he thinks are necessary when thinking toward social change that
needs to occur. This section will focus on a close reading as an attempt to bring forward
the philosophical assumptions contained in Illich’s thinking and the way they inform the
institutional analysis that he performs in the rest of the chapter. Paragraph 2 in its entirety
reads:
I believe that a desirable future depends on our deliberately choosing a life of
action over a life of consumption, on our engendering a life style which will enable us to
be spontaneous, independent, yet related to each other, rather than maintaining a life style
which only allows us to make and unmake, produce and consume–a style of life which is
merely a way station on the road to depletion and pollution of the environment. The
future depends more upon our choice of institutions which support a life of action than on
our developing new ideologies and technologies. We need a set of criteria which will
permit us to recognize those institutions which support personal growth rather than
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addiction, as well as the will to invest our technological resources preferentially in such
institutions of growth. (pp. 52-53)
This preference for a life of action, against consumption and the bare necessities
of life, is not unique to Illich. Indeed, it traces back to ancient Greece in the political
thought of Plato and Aristotle. Additionally, Hannah Arendt (1958), pulling directly from
the ancients, resides among the twentieth century’s great political philosophers. Her most
significant study of politics is The Human Condition. Written clearly and with an
unmistakable debt to Aristotelian political philosophy, this work will help to clarify
exactly where Illich (and most moderns without realizing) stands. The next chapter will
then begin the work of critiquing this position.
Without explicitly doing so, Illich (1970), by calling for a future in which
individuals live lives of action, in which consumption is not front and center, is taking the
position which holds the good life as life’s highest ideal. This, according to Arendt
(1958), is what “Aristotle called the life of the citizen [which is] not merely better, more
carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It was ‘good’
to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from
labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own
survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process.” (pg. 37). To live a life of
action, the good life, individuals must rise above the basic necessities of living and live,
instead, for the public good.
Illich’s (1970) praise for action and rejection of a lifestyle “which only allows us
to make and unmake, produce and consume” (pp. 52-53) is an almost direct echo of
Arendt’s (1958) categorization of human life into three broad categories: labor, work, and
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action. Labor, always necessary, is what humans do to sustain their own lives. Humans
grow and prepare food; make and mend clothing; eat, brush teeth, etc. Work on the other
hand, is not about sustaining life, but producing things that outlast individuals:
architecture, trade work, building, crafts, all of these are the product of work. Action, the
highest of the human possibilities, is the activity of participating in and influencing the
public sphere and, as noted above, requires the individual to transcends the other two.
The passage cited above clearly demonstrates that Illich (1970) feels that action is
either not possible or rarely possible in the modern, industrial world. But why Illich holds
this position is not entirely clear. Fortunately, Arendt’s analysis addresses this problem
directly. Arendt (1958) distinguishes between the public, private, and social. In ancient
Greece, as one might expect, the public is the arena in which individuals acted. Labor and
work were done in private. In order to enter the public space, one had to have the affairs
of their private life in such a state that would afford them time to enter and participate in
the public, hence the population of citizens, those who could participate publicly, was
much smaller than the overall population. The social, on the other hand, is distinctly
modern and arose as a result of the emergence of the private into the public; “society [the
social] … conquered the public realm” (pg. 41). As a result, “society…excludes the
possibility of action…. Society expects from each of its members a certain kind of
behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its
members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding
achievement.” (pg. 40). Arendt’s description of the interruption caused by society and
Illich’s institutional critique echo one another.
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Illich (1970) considers schools to be among the types of institutions that he
categorizes as manipulative institutions. Consider how closely his description of the
function of schools is to Arendt’s characterization of the social. He writes, “schools
themselves pervert the natural inclination to grow and learn into the demand for
instruction” (pg. 60). Demanding instruction instead of following inclination is precisely
the exclusion of spontaneous action described by Arendt. He also laments that “by
making men abdicate the responsibility for their own growth, school leads many to a kind
of spiritual suicide” (pg. 60). And if all of this is a result of the collapse of the public and
private into each other, the emergence of a new social, then of course the most
appropriate intervention would be to call for action, the reemergence of a genuine public
sphere. But this ideal is not without its critics.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMOCRATIC APPROACH?
Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that Illich’s (1970) call for the dismantling
of schooling in Deschooling Society might not be the best way to approach problems in
education and schooling. With that said, much of his best thinking on the matter has been
left unmentioned. It is the intention of this chapter to bring what I see as Illich’s strongest
critique of school, that it is compulsory, into conversation with the democratic education
theory put forward by Amy Gutmann. In this sense, the silenced voice of Illich will be
able to speak with a leading voice in education scholarship. While the previous chapter
suggested that a reform or revolution in education need not necessarily be rid of the
institution of schools all together, nothing yet has been said regarding how this will look.
Likewise, this chapter will continue the work of taking this critique another step further
before, in later chapters, proposing a more comprehensive vision for education.
The previous chapter ended with a discussion linking parts of Illich’s thinking
with that of Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition. As was discussed, the influence of
Aristotle on Arendt is significant. And it is precisely at this juncture that we can in a
certain way see Illich and Guttman working in the same domain. If Illich’s metaphysics
and politics are implicitly Aristotelian, Gutmann (1987) is explicit in this connection,
particularly in connection with the Politics. The obvious question that follows from this is
how can this fundamental, but hidden, link between two diametrically opposed thinkers
help to unravel the opposition and chart a new path forward?
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The answer to this question will be something like this: though Illich is closer to
the target, both thinkers misunderstand the consequences of compulsory schooling on
political life. In order to make sense of this claim, it is first important to return to the
work of Giorgio Agamben, this time in his first major work, Homo Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life where he identifies a key problem in western metaphysics that
originates in Aristotle, the division between biological life and a qualified life.
Defining Life: Zoē and Bios
It should be remembered that key to Arendt’s (1958) understanding of action is
that it takes place in a separate, public sphere apart from the duties of labor, which are
necessary for the preservation of life and a private affair. And while these duties are
essential, attaining the ability to live a life of action is preferable. This division, as was
noted, comes directly from Aristotle and is the distinction at which Agamben (2017)
directs his critique in Homo Sacer. Agamben opens the book exploring the following:
“the Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word ‘life.’ They used
two terms that… are semantically and morphologically distinct” (pg. 5). The terms they
used for life are zoē and bios. Zoē “expressed the simple fact of living common to all
living beings” while bios “indicated a form or way of living proper to an individual or
group” (pg. 5). While Arendt (1958) is doing original thinking and not simply rehashing
Aristotelian categories, it is clear enough that her thought can be mapped on to this
classical division. After all, this simple fact of living, zoē, is clearly analogous to the
category of labor, which always serves the continuance of life itself. At the other end of
the spectrum is bios, the qualified life, the life defined by what it does, the life of action.
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Paradoxically, the problem for Agamben (2017) is not simply that the separation
of these two conceptions of life leads to the exclusion of bare life, zoē, from political life
which prizes “a qualified life, a particular way of life” (pg. 5) over life-as-such. The real
issue here is that this exclusion creates an inclusion of bare life in politics–by way of
exclusion. In fact, the principal thesis put forward is that “Western politics first
constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare
life.”(pg. 9). And most importantly, this exclusion has a tremendous effect on political
life in modernity.
According to my reading of Agamben’s complex work in Homo Sacer, modern
democracy is altogether different from classical democracy. Much like Arendt (1958)
who saw a blurring between private and public life resulting in a new social sphere,
Agamben (2017) notes that “modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a
vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare
life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē” (pg. 11). In other words,
bare life in modernity has become the principal concern of politics rather than what is
excluded. Drawing attention to the work of Foucault, Agamben points out that this is the
origin of Biopower. But unlike Arendt, who would solve this problem with a return to the
classical division of public and private life, zoē and bios, Agamben at one and the same
time recognizes that there is no going back but, also, that this development reveals a truth
at the foundation of all politics, namely the domination of sovereign, political power over
bare life; though it has only now become apparent, it has always been the case. And
because it has always been the case it is from this fundamental truth in western politics
that any interventions must be proposed.
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In Agamben’s (2017) own words, “every attempt to rethink the political space of
the West must begin with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the
classical distinction between zoē and bios, between private life and political existence,
between man as a simple living being at home in the house and man’s political existence
in the city” (pg. 153). Agamben sees the emergence of camps (e.g. refugee camps) in the
20th century as the most clear example of the collapse of this classical distinction. Camps
are a place where physical survival itself becomes for the individuals its own “particular
way of life” (pg. 5). In the camp an individual’s bios, their life’s form, is bare life itself.
The two become indistinguishable. And, unfortunately, “there is no return from the
camps to classical politics. In the camps, city and house became indistinguishable, and
the possibility of differentiating between our biological body and our political body…
was taken from us forever” (pg. 153).
It should be clear that, while literal camps are the primary example, Agamben is
also drawing an analogy between life in camps and life in the modern world. Life outside
the camps now looks more and more like life in camps. And while there is true horror in
this new reality, there is an angle that can provide a way forward politically without
dreaming of a return to classical politics. This for Agamben is the inoperative; bios as
bare existence is form-of-life. He writes in the final pages of Homo Sacer: “if we give the
name form-of-life to this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life that,
being its own form, remains inseparable from it, we will witness the emergence of a field
of research beyond the terrain defined by the intersection of politics and philosophy” (pg.
153). And in the field of education, recognizing that education is political, it is essential
that inoperativity and form-of-life guide our analysis of existing approaches.
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Deliberation, Democracy, and Compulsory Schooling
In certain ways, reading Amy Gutmann’s (1987) Democratic Education is a
breath of fresh air. At a foundational level, the division between deliberative and nondeliberative democracy (pp. xii-xiii) is of maximum importance because it shows how
democracy is effective while recognizing that it can, when not deliberative, also “treat
people as objects of legislation, as passive subjects to be ruled” (pg. xii). Though she
does not outright say so, the sense is that we currently live in non-deliberative
democracy. Deliberative democracy requires full participation by each member of the
society in conversations around issues. This requires that each person possess the skill-set
to think about and discuss their point of view and listen to those of others before
decisions are made. Unfortunately, a big question remains unaddressed regarding
deliberation, though we can assume that the remainder of the book is Gutamann’s attempt
at a demonstration of why the answer might be in the affirmative: is a truly deliberative
form of democracy even possible? And if so, is her approach to democracy and education
sufficient to achieve a society of deliberative citizens?
Guttman (1987) shows her commitment to classical politics that was critiqued
above when she justifies the existence of schooling on Aristotle’s belief that in order to
rule individuals must first be ruled, recognizing that in a democracy each individual has a
role as ruler and should be equipped for the job (pg.3). What Aristotle (2005) says in this
section is that individuals “should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey
like a freeman–these are the virtues of a citizen” (pg 62, 1277b). While it is not explicitly
stated, this is the obvious defense of obligatory, compulsory schooling. Put in terms
already deployed in this chapter, in order to have the bios of a citizen ruler, an individual
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must first obey according to the form of this bios. Clearly, Gutmann, by structuring her
argument according to classical concepts, has failed to address the more fundamental
problem for politics, the zoē-bios split.
Because of this failure, a problematic contradiction begins to appear when studied
closely. She brilliantly writes, “deliberative democracy underscores the importance of
publicly supported education that develops the capacity to deliberate among all children
as future free and equal citizens” (pg. xii) This is certainly true, but at this point, nothing
can be said about the necessity of compulsory schooling to achieve this end. The problem
here is the insistence on politicizing–giving a bios to–individuals through schooling. This
bios is deliberation which makes deliberation operative and serves the purpose of social
reproduction. And, the conclusion is, if students don’t reach the point of being good
delibrators, they have not, by implication, achieved a good life. This is made evident in
the way she defines education. Education, she writes, is “the conscious efforts of men
and women to inform the intellect and to shape the character of less educated people”
followed by the question “what kind of people should human education seek to create?”
(pg. 19). This can not more clearly demonstrate the rehashing of the exclusion of“bare
life” in exchange for “a qualified life”(Agamben, 2017, pg. 5).
The contradiction is that this insistence on creating a new, more capable
individual than the one that enters school misunderstands deliberation. Deliberation in
this sense becomes, exactly as Illich (1970) fears, a good to be consumed not a practice
that is willingly engaged in for its own sake.
In order to be truly deliberative, the practice must exist in the realm of
inoperativity. Deliberation itself is a kind of searching, recognizing that there is always
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potential to not reach a conclusion. Inoperativity, form-of-life, in its very conception,
cannot be compulsory. To compel can only be justified on operative grounds. So, making
a fundamentally inoperative activity compulsory is to demand an end that can never be
achieved. Yes, the state can and should sponsor robust public education, which both Illich
(1970) and Gutmann (1987) agree with, but if it is truly to serve a deliberative politics it
cannot be made mandatory. This is both a fundamendamental problem that supporters of
democracy must contend with and the unfortunate set of circumstances that equitable,
participatory politics must accept before any meaningful change in educational approach
can occur.
Further, Gutmann (1987) criticizes functional theorists who “ invoke an
intuitively implausible and empirically unverified form of determinism” (pg. 10) that
allows for a critique of education and schooling without having to provide any
meaningful results. The problem here is that by insisting that education’s primary
function is to support deliberative democracy–the ability to accomplish such a task being
questionable at best–then it allows democratic theorists to continue calling for more
democracy and when it never arrives and bemoan the current undemocratic system even
further. Ultimately, this type of treatment doesn’t pose a threat to the system as it is and
can be openly praised without the possibility of ever having much of an effect.
This is why statements such as “we can appreciate the centrality of schooling to
democratic education and still recognize that there is much more to democratic education
than schooling” (Gutmann, 1987, pg. 16) are so frustrating. There is an insistence on
defending compulsory education without ever giving its critique fair treatment yet, at the
same time, pointing to the fact that education is so much more than school. She is
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absolutely correct when she says that “the main problem with primary schooling today is
not that it does not compensate for the failures of other social institutions…but that it
does not prepare students for democratic citizenship” (Gutmann, 1987,pg 148) But that
she never recognizes that it might be incapable of making that guarantee is a major
weakness.
This does not mean that Illich’s (1970) concern with compulsory schooling hit the
nail on the head either. He seems primarily concerned with two points. One that the legal
obligation to go to school is a violation of rights and that schooling does not even do
what it purports to do–create a more equitable society. He writes: “neither in North
America nor in Latin America do the poor get equality from obligatory schools. But in
both places the mere existence of school discourages and disables the poor from taking
control of their own learning” (Illich, pg. 8). Though he does recognize that schools do
not do what they purport to do, that is, form citizens for life in a democracy, he does not
seem to understand why this is the case.
Deliberation and contemplation bring enjoyment. Deliberation and contemplation,
which, as will be shown, are not only political but also ethical, are fundamental to the
interior life. But they cannot be legalized or coerced. If there is to be a way forward for
school and education as a whole, this is a central problem to be solved.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ENJOYMENT AND THE FACE
School as an Instrument
In a brilliant dissertation titled Why School?: A Systems Perspective on Creating
Schooling for Flourishing Individuals and a Thriving Democratic Society, Erin Raab
(2017) categorizes the principal justifications for schooling, showing that scholars
typically fall into a framework that distinguishes between Intrinsic and Instrumental
justifications on one hand and Individual and Collective on the other. While she starts
with the principle that “schooling is a teleological system – it has a purpose” (pg. 3), she
spends much time arguing that focusing on the instrumental purposes of schooling (i.e.
schools should exist for the benefit of economic, military, and other social factors) is
problematic. This distinction is made because, according to her, “we must define the
‘problem of schooling’ correctly. Generating solutions to the wrong problem, or for a
misunderstood purpose, may create ‘innovation,’ but it won’t necessarily create positive
change” (pg. 7) and her goal is to see meaningful overhaul of the system of schooling
itself.
While it is disappointing that she never takes up the debate around schooling and
deschooling which one would expect from a work titled Why School?, she does appear to
take the conversation about school into important territory. Ultimately, the project seems
less about answering the question “Why School?” but more about the question “since we
have school, what is the best way to do it?” On this point, there is a clear recognition that
all societies have educated the members of the society for intrinsic personal and social
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reasons, and that our society has chosen schooling as the method for doing this. In this
sense, she takes a realist approach that is valuable to this study.
The previous sections have sought to problematize the conversation about
schooling from both sides: pro schooling and anti schooling. Every teacher in K-12
schools has been asked “why do I have to do this?” by a student. At this point it should be
more clear that making school obligatory is the cause of these ‘what-for?’ questions that
students have always asked. The only justifiable answer to a question like this can be
given in instrumental terms. But at its core, education and scholarship as it is being
presented here is definitively non-instrumental, in the limited sense that instrumental and
utilitarian judgements are one and the same.
While one could easily become hopeless if they accept the claim that compulsory
schools are not capable of achieving their most noble ends, particularly, as demonstrated
in the previous chapter, that of creating engaged, democratic citizens. What is most
important in Raab’s work is that it accepts schooling as the educational reality that we
live with, like it or not. It is from this recognition that the second chapter, which sought to
show the way Francis and his followers were able to strike out in their own direction
without ever having to bring down the Church because their form-of-life was could not
be contained or limited by the legal structures created by the Church; they could go on
living according to their form-of-life regardless of the institutional barriers before them.
The same might be said, if not of students, of educators themselves.
While the next chapter will really flush out this idea, this chapter will explore to
what extent the form-of-life par excellence ought to be determined by the exemplary
ethical life and how the Other puts our possessions into question. The idea of separation
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and the face of the other (Levinas, 1969), the great ethical call, are vital in forming a
concrete theory connecting education in the twenty-first century to a distinct form-oflife.
Childhood to Adulthood
We cannot rid the world of historically totalizing forces, but schooling, like
capital, is an invasion in the very private part of individual lives that is necessary for
separation and the ethical relation–welcoming the Other.
We cannot command members of a society to live up to their responsibility to the
face of the Other but ought we provide them with the necessary experiences that would
encourage such responsibility? Levinas seeks to demonstrate how the process of
separation is a necessary prerequisite for the ethical relation. If this is the case, it must be
something at the forefront of any thinking about school and its aims. Not only this, but it
also requires that we take a closer look at the process of separation and what it has to do
with entering adulthood.
While a central concern of mine is to promote a theory of education that
recognizes that education is endless, that it occurs throughout the life and that schooling,
by signaling clear end points, distorts this reality, it would also be incorrect to neglect the
role that primary schooling plays in the transition from childhood to adulthood. As Illich
(1970), Gutmann (1987), and Raab (2017) all recognize, schooling is not the only way a
society can choose to help its younger members make this transition, it is the way that
ours does. Of key importance, then, is developing a clear understanding of this
transitional phase and what it might entail.
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Lloyd Demause (1982), in Foundations of Psychohistory, identifies the horrors of
childrearing historically and proposes a psychohistorical approach to history which
argues, “the central force for change in history is neither technology nor economics, but
the ‘psychogenic’ changes in personality occurring be-cause[sic] of successive
generations of parent-child interactions'' ( pg. 4). In other words, poor child rearing
practices traumatize whole generations of adults, causing myriad social problems as a
result. These adults then traumatize their children because they have unprocessed trauma
of their own and the cycle continues. Demause (1982) identifies six historical modes of
child rearing representing “a continuous sequence of closer approaches between parent
and child as generation after generation of parents slowly overcame their anxieties and
began to develop the capacity to identify and satisfy the needs of their children” (pg. 62).
These six modes, proceeding from Antiquity to today are: Infanticidal Mode,
Abandoning Mode, Ambivalent Mode, Intrusive Mode, Socializing Mode, & Helping
Mode.
The value of thinking of history in terms of childrearing modes is that it helps us
to more clearly understand what mode schools have worked within. Foucault’s (1977)
work in Discipline and Punish clearly identifies early schooling with the Intrusive Mode.
While some scholars (Chomsky, 2011; Gabbard, 2011; Illich, 1970; Saltman, 2011) argue
that this remains true, we can also see an ideology of socialization not only at work in
democratic education theorists like Gutmann (1987) and Raab (2017) but also to a certain
extent in the realm of critical pedagogy with thinkers like Friere (2000) and Giroux
(2020) who are critical of the disciplining Intrusive Mode and attempt to point the way
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toward a mode of schooling that socializes adolescents on into adult society. All of this,
though, says little of the Helping Mode identified by Demause (1982).
In a later book, The Emotional Life of Nations, Demause (2002) provides a
framework to think about what he means by Helping Mode and this reveals how the
framework might be used in consideration of ethical responsibility when it comes to
compulsory schooling. Drawing on psychoanalysis, Demause focuses on the need for
individuation. Historically (and currently) many people never really individuated from
their parents and society because they were used as ‘poison containers’ for their own
parent’s traumas and ‘desires’ for them and were never given the space for becoming
individuals of their own. While the Socializing Mode hinders individuation, the primary
objective of parents and other adults responsible for bringing children to adulthood is
occupying a helping role in their process of individuation.
All of this would be meaningless if there were no discussion of the difference
between a child and an adult. In a seminal article on this topic, Tamar Schapiro (1999)
takes up the difficult task of considering what a child is and what our responsibility to
children might be. Schapiro takes up the question using Kant’s conception of freedom of
the will, ultimately addressing the question: at what point does a child, dependent on the
adults around them, develop a free will of their own? Freedom, for Kant, requires that an
individual take up as their own a set of maxims that guide their behavior (Kant, 2012). As
naturally follows, an ethical person would take up a set of maxims that are ethically
grounded. As such, although we can not make a person ethical, the first step to an ethical
(or moral) life is to take up a set of maxims of one’s own. As Schapiro (1999) writes, “the
problem is that man, now aware of his capacity for freedom, has to find a way of
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governing himself as a free will” (pg. 723). The problem for adult society is not that
“attempting to perfect others is paternalistic, but that it is, strictly speaking, impossible”
(pg. 724) so the goal of education should not, can not, be to make perfect
individuals/citizens. If anything, schooling in its best form can only serve to make
children into adults. Defined by Schapiro (1999), an adult is a person “who is in a
position to speak in her own voice, the voice of one who stands in a determinate,
authoritative relation to the various motivation forces within her” while a child is one
who “is not yet in a position to speak in her own voice because there is no voice which
counts as hers” (pg. 729). Therefore the goal of childrearing should focus on giving
children what is necessary to become free agents, to ‘speak with their own voices’ so to
say; further, adults “should make it our end to do what is in our power as adults to help
children work their way out of childhood” (pg. 735).
Daniel Weinstock (2016) wrote an important response and critique of Schapiro’s
approach to the question of adult responsibility to the child, but on most points he is in
agreement. His most salient points come toward the conclusion, particularly in their
ability to add nuance to Schapiro who comes off as black and white when attempting to
decipher when a person has selected maxims of their own and reached full adulthood.
Weinstock argues that a person, in order to have reached adulthood, does not have to
reach full and complete autonomy, writing “there is a point at which it makes sense to
treat an agent as a morally responsible adult, not because her maxims have reached a
final, unalterable state, but because they are stable enough” (pg. 57). Ultimately we
should not have such a high bar that no one ever gets to be an adult. Rather, just the
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opposite. When someone reaches the point where they have established some set of
maxims, even if basic, they ought to be treated as adults.
Kohan (2011), though working outside a Kantian framework, developed a theory
and method for teaching philosophy in schools that is supported by the work done by
Demause (1982; 2002) and Schapiro (1999). Kohan (2011) conceptualizes philosophy as
play and play as a form of ‘becoming child’. Ultimately, for the big picture, he proposes a
pedagogy that focuses on engaging students in thinking critically without imposing preset
ideas or curriculum, certainly reflecting a commitment to helping rather than socializing.
The central question of this article is stated clearly when he asks “how might the
purposes of practicing philosophy with children be affirmed other than as toward the
social and political education of childhood?”(pg. 341) Kohan rejects the current trend of
teaching philosophy in schools for political ends, i.e. to make good, democratic citizens.
Kohan, as I see it, aligns with the Demausian injunction to help students individuate. In
order to do this, adults (educators) have to let them freely explore ideas rather than
impose a predetermined version of what is correct. As if responding to Kant (through
Schapiro) and Demause, Kohan (2011) writes “the emancipatory teacher works upon the
will of the student through liberating her intelligence to work by itself—which he can do
only under the presupposition that all intelligences are equal” (pg. 351) and “we work to
establish a context for thinking, and a pedagogical relationship in which the student
realizes that the teacher does not want to transfer, bestow, or engineer the appearance of
anything to or in the student, but is confident in the potential of her thinking, and in her
capacity to share a thinking process with others” (pg. 352). This approach goes one step
further than Raab (2017) who recognizes on one hand that “if we want to ensure the

34
ability of our society to adapt to changes in the environment, we need schools to be
organized for intrinsic purposes and with aims of maximizing potential for anomalous
thinking and new perspectives” (pg. 32) yet on the other seems to hang on to the notion,
also found in Gutmann (1987) that schools “serve two broad functions: 1) to reproduce or
replicate society, and 2) to renew society” (Raab, 2017, pg. 29).
Enjoyment
Emmanuel Levinas is distinctly not Kantian, though it is also hard for all
philosophers that come after Kant to get out of his shadow. And though Levinas’ (1969)
work in Totality and Infinity dispenses of Kant’s rationalist insistence on the taking up a
set of maxims, through concepts like Interiority, separation, and Exteriority he sets out to
rework concepts that are central to Kant, particularly freedom and responsibility. This
section will maintain fidelity to Demause’s (1982) six modes of child rearing, not
because his work is without critique, particularly its progressive view of history, but
because it forces a closer look at what it might mean to help a child individuate. And
while thinking about individuation in terms of Kantian maxims seems to have some value
in thinking through what this helping hand might be, Levinas’ understanding of the
development of subjectivity is vital to this discussion.
There is a constellation of concepts at work here that are all similar and work
together. It should be clear as this discussion progresses that Demaus’ (1982; 2002)
concept of individuation is similar to what Levinas (1969) means by Interiority and
Separation. These concepts refer to the point in life where a person recognizes that,
though they are inescapably situated within the world, they have an interior life that is
uniquely separate from it as well; this is the point at which a sense of self begins to
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develop. Prior to this, caught in what Levinas (1969) terms the same, the experience of
life is that of being in a web of social relations in which there is no clear distinction
between individuals. Because of this, a person is not truly able to recognize an ‘Other’
unless first going through separation and recognizing their own distinct interior life. Key
here is that this interior life is where the experience of enjoyment lies.
In order to show how the interior life is a life of enjoyment Levinas (1969)
distinguishes between nutritive needs and the act of “living-from.” It is common to say
that one needs food because of biological needs, for the nutrition that it provides to our
organism. Levinas challenges this reduction: “the consumption of foods” he writes, “is
the food of life” (pg. 114). In other words, people do not eat food simply because it
nourishes their biological being, but more importantly we live from the act of eating. We
enjoy eating and, here is the key, “subjectivity originates in the independence and
sovereignty of enjoyment” (pg. 114). It is from the enjoyment of living-from that we
become independent subjects rather than anonymous members of the same.
Key here is that individuals do not simply enjoy and live-from food alone.
Strikingly in alignment with Agamben (2017), who in Homo Sacer problematized the
metaphysical distinction between bare life and the qualified life, Levinas (1969) writes
“the bare fact of life is never bare” (pg. 112). Bare life is not simply sustenance. It is from
this bare life that we actually live. We can start to see here how our bios become our zoē.
This is precisely what is meant by enjoyment. Even more clearly stated, “life is love of
life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear than my being: thinking,
eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun” (pg. 112). We live-from
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and find enjoyment in the contents and activities of our interior, separated life. This is a
process that must be undergone.
The more broad connection to the larger conversation about education can be
deciphered in a key moment in Totality and Infinity: “food can be interpreted as an
implement only in a world of exploitation” (Levinas, 1969, pg. 134). By implement,
Levinas is referring to making food a tool for basic sustenance of our bare life rather than
something we live-from and enjoy. Cannot this exact thing be said if we replace food
with education? Where individuals and knowledge itself are exploited for some social
‘good’, even if that good is deliberation or equity for all, we must conclude that education
is being made operative as an implement for some greater end. As soon as we start
thinking this way, we have missed the point. We live-from study, from education, from
the leisure that is originally at the heart of the school day (we should acknowledge that
school originates from Greek scholē and denotes leisure and discussion (MerriamWebster, n.d.)).
The Face
Kant’s (2012) deontological ethics holds that certain acts are universally,
categorically ethical or unethical and the role of the individual subject is to take up their
own law or set of maxims that lead to ethical behavior. Levinas (1969), against Kant and
through a more robust analysis of the emergence of the individual subject as discussed
above, develops an ethics that is purely relational. For Levinas, prior to any metaphysical
distinction are social relationships. In separation individuals begin to distinguish self, I,
from the rest of the world. This is essential because without first separating and
recognizing the self as totally different from the rest of the world, there can be no way to
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recognize in the face of the Other someone who is infinitely different and unknowable.
Ultimately, this is a bit of a reciprocal relationship since “the idea of infinity, revealed in
the face, does not only require a separated being; the light of the face is necessary for
separation” (pg. 151).
It is this experience of the infinitely unknowable Other that opens the possibility
for discourse and calls the separate, egotistical I into question. Discourse that opens
between the “I” and the Other is fundamental for understanding Levinasian ethics. “In
discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the other, and this urgency of response—
acuteness of the present—engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to
my final reality” (Levinas, 1969, pg 178). Again, although it puts the separate I who
enjoys into question, makes the I responsible, that initial separation is essential for the
existence of the ethical relation; there is no ethical relation between I and Other without
first separating as an I. Distinct from Kant’s (2012) universal ethics, all ethics for Levinas
start with a particular moment, and encounter between an I and an Other, what he calls
the face-to-face.
While these ethical approaches are distinct they both are dependent on the
moments where separation takes place. From this discussion, then, we can draw
important conclusions regarding education: first, when considering the aspect of
education that deals primarily with helping children enter adult society and developing
practices that help students find enjoyment in separation is central; second, and most
importantly, that separated individuals live-from and enjoy food, reading, and study not
for some teleological ends but because it is fundamentally human to find pleasure in these
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things. Finally, if the ethical relation is primary, then all operative justifications for
obligatory schooling begin to crumble.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY AND CONTEMPLATION
“A Little Different”
Returning to the critique of Aristotle’s division of bios and zoē , the relevance of
Agamben’s development of form-of-life, use, and the inoperative life become essential
concepts for developing an approach to education that both has the potential to be truly
meaningful for all students and teachers and yet be resilient in the face of public policy
that may not always in the best interest of students and an educated society. In previous
sections, Illich’s (1970) anti-institutional justification for the eradication of schooling in
Deschooling Society and Gutmann’s (1987) belief that school should ultimately serve a
deliberative democracy in Democratic Education have been problematized. Against
Illich, it was proposed that there might be a way of thinking about education and
schooling that does not require institutional overthrow. Yet, this was immediately
followed by a critique of compulsory education, showing that Guttmann’s lofty ends of
an educated, deliberative citizenry are not realistic.
Much of what has been said thus far has been in anticipation of a more fully
developed discussion proposing that two interrelated concepts developed by Giorgio
Agamben (2000; 2013, 2017, 2019), form-of-life and inoperativity, are concepts that
need to be at the center of any discussion about education going forward. The previous
chapter sought to lay a groundwork for better understanding these difficult concepts
through a reading of Levinas’ (1969) philosophy of enjoyment in living-from rather than
biological dependence.
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As was proposed at the beginning, a central aim of this thesis is to consider how
we might say something in response to Benjamin (1999) who’s messianic Judaism led
him to conclude that the future will be “mostly the same, only a little different” (pg. 664).
What is at stake here is how we conceive of this little difference.
If a theory of form-of-life is that ‘little difference’ then it is essential to be as clear
as possible what is meant by the term. While there is overlap with Camus’ (1965)
response to the absurdity of life in The Myth of Sisyphus, form-of-life is distinct from
what is typically classified in existentialist thinking as projects. Project implies a point of
culmination. A form-of-life, however, as made clear through the use and habits of the
body, is lived and contemplated in each moment, in the form itself. There is no striving
for, but only being (Agamben, 2017). To start, it is important to understand what
Agamben (2013) means by highest poverty and how it relates to the inoperative.
The Highest Poverty and Use
In its most simple formulation, Agamben (2013) uses the term ‘highest poverty’
in reference to the Franciscan rejection of all rights to property and personal ownership.
Highest poverty, being simply another way of describing form-of-life, is “not in any way
reducible to a normative code” (pg. 98) because, as he demonstrates, the Franciscans,
unlike the monastics that came before them, assert only “the right to have no rights”
through the renunciation of all personal property (pg. 124). Through complex legal
argumentation, Franciscan scholars hoped to demonstrate that even the habits they wore
were not property, but simply items in their use. It is only through this concept of use,
that it becomes entirely clear how the Franciscans, were not simply renunciants, but
adhered in their lives to a form entirely separate from the institutional structured Church
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that was so determinative of the lives of everyone in late medieval Europe (Agamben,
2013).
Use, as a concept, is further developed in the final book of the Homo Sacer
Omnibus series titled The Use of Bodies. Agamben’s (2017) most clear example of what
he means by use comes in a paragraph about walking that needs to be quoted at length.
He writes:
Just as, in the experience of making a visit expressed by the Hebrew verb, the
subject constitutes himself as visiting and, in the experience of walking, the subject first
of all walks himself, has an experience of himself as walking, in the same way every use
is first of all use of self: to enter into a relation of use with something, I must be affected
by it, constitute myself as one who makes use of it. Human being and world are, in use, in
a relationship of absolute and reciprocal immanence; in the using of something, it is the
very being of the one using that is first of all at stake (pg. 1054).
This reciprocal relationship between being affected by something and being in use
of it is of critical importance. Use, which is form-of-life, undoes the relationship between
means and ends where everything becomes a means unto itself, where “nothing is being
produced or acted but rather something is being endured and supported” (Agamben,
2000, pg. 56). This, finally, is what is meant by inoperativity. To be clear, we should not
mistake inoperativity as “indicating simple inactivity, as a form of passivity and utter
absence of all labour” (Marmont & Primera, 2020, pg. 9) but instead recognize that that
inoperative is not a prohibition on activity. Inoperativity denotes a type of activity that
has no end in mind, is all means without end, where “the act of creation is a field of
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forces stretched between potential and impotential” (Agamben, 2019, pg. 19) rather than
toward finality.
Implications
What we live-from, to call back to Levinas (1969), can have no end. Human
study, rest, play, enjoyment is at its core, fundamentally inoperative. The problem with
compulsory schooling, as demonstrated earlier, should now be more clear. Compulsory
schooling, as Raab (2017) so rightly points out, is a teleological system and, thus, must
lead toward predetermined ends. Even when these ends have a noble ring to them like
social (re)production and political deliberation, they are fundamentally at odds with the
enjoyment humans draw from study, curiosity, and play that are means unto themselves.
Illich (1993), though critiqued in chapter two, was clearly in alignment with this
view, especially in light of what might be his greatest piece of scholarship, In the
Vineyard of the Text. In this study of the work of the late medieval pedagogue, Hugh of
St. Victor, Illich repeatedly invokes wandering scholars, houses of reading, and scholars
in exile. In an attempt to discern how education, scholarship, and reading were
approached in the late medieval period compared to the present, Illich clearly sums up the
difference suggesting that modern reading is for commuters and tourists rather than
pedestrians and pilgrims (pg. 110). What jumps out in this comparison, is the relevance
of Agamben in reading the opposition of commuter/tourists to pedestrian/pilgrims.
Commuters and tourists connote people with ends and objectives whereas pedestrians and
pilgrims are individuals who are in a position of use, and therefore get us closer to formof-life.
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This should not be surprising because a central metaphor of Illich’s (1993) book
is that reading, for Hugh, was not about reading cover-to-cover and feeling accomplished
when completion has been reached, but is instead like a leisurely stroll through a
vineyard, plucking grapes and savoring their various flavors. In this type of reading is
enjoyment, pleasure, and a contemplative spirit that does not seek a final conclusion. This
kind of reading is ruminatory. This approach is most apparent when Hugh (1991) writes
“the start of learning, thus, lies in reading, but its consummation lies in meditation:
which, if any man will learn to love it very intimately and will desire to be engaged very
frequently upon it, renders his life pleasant indeed, and provides the greatest consolation
to him in his trials” (pg. 93). This is undoubtedly the same conclusion that Levinas
(1969) reaches about living-from. Learning starts by specifically developing a certain set
of skills but ultimately this is not because it will necessarily achieve something, but
because meditation and contemplation are enjoyable. This should provide more context
justifying why Illich (1970) has such a problem with schooling which he reads as entirely
antithetical to the vineyard approach to reading.
Not What, but How
How then can we justify maintaining the institution of school? It seems then that
the reasons to be opposed to compulsory schooling are too numerous to ignore. To state it
as clearly as possible, it is not the conclusion of this study that schooling is ultimately
justifiable on the grounds presented up to this point. That said, it seems
counterproductive to ignore the realist position which is that schooling exists and there is
currently no indication that it will go anywhere in the near future. Further, because
schooling is funded with tax dollars and argued over publicly, it should not be expected
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that lawmakers will consider anything but an operative approach to public education. It
should not be controversial to point out that for all the money being spent on education
that lawmakers could never be satisfied with a proposal that simply wants to give
students a space to become vineyard dwellers, lovers of leisure, scholē-ed instead of
schooled. That said, lawmakers would be hard pressed to deny the intrinsic desire that
humans have for study and leisure that have nothing to do with economic and social
objectives. Finally, it would be a tragedy if people predisposed to be educators threw up
their hands and gave up in futility because of the precariousness of the educator in this
field of concerns governing their lives. So what can educators who suspect that there is
something the matter with compulsory schooling do?
Before approaching this question, it needs to be stated that I have no intention of
drawing up prescriptions for educators, precisely because, considering use and
inoperativity are underutilized theoretical concepts in educational discourses, it would
not only be severely premature at this stage of the conversation but also because
inoperativity as a framework for thinking is itself not exactly open to a prescriptive
approach.
That said, Agamben (2017) gestures toward an approach to answering this
question most clearly when he clarifies that form-of-life has less to do with what I am,
than how I am what I am (pg. 1237). Pointing to the Myth of Er section in Plato’s
Republic (2005) which describes Er going to the underworld and observing the process
by which souls choose the life that they are going to take before being born on earth.
Central for Agamben in reading this allegory is not that souls choose the form (bios) their
life takes but that the form is only the ‘what’ their life is going to be, meaning that in any
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given form an individual still can be good or evil. The way life is lived is not determined,
only the form it takes. Form of life (bios) transforms into form-of-life only when the how
is made explicit, because how one lives, how one uses one’s being and existence is what
is most vital.
Again, the goal here is not to prescribe specifically in what way the how question
is to be answered by those who have chosen the form of educator. But it should not be
controversial to agree with Illich (1993) that “the learned ought to be an example to the
unlearned” (pp. 80-81). In this way, the emphasis is on how educators approach teaching,
not on how students approach learning. And maybe we can let Hugh of St. Victor (1991)
give us the word in response to this difficult question:
“If, however, you desire to be the learned teacher, hear what you shall do. The
inexpensiveness of your dress and the simplicity expressed in your countenance,
the innocence of your life and the holiness of your behavior ought to teach men.
You teach better by fleeing the world than by following after” (pg. 131)
Teachers teach best who adopt the principles of use and the highest poverty,
where there is no end in mind, but only the pure human enjoyment of living-from
teaching, learning, and leisurely walking in the vineyard.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
The trouble with Agamben as a thinker, to borrow from a common metaphor, is
that he is operating as a blindfolded man trying to understand an elephant. Use, bare life,
highest poverty, and inoperativity, among others, are all attempts at describing the
elephant from different angles. The core concept, form-of-life, is the elephant. Toward
the end of The Use of Bodies, Agamben (2017), pulls these concepts together in a way
that clearly highlights the centrality of contemplation as a final key to understanding
form-of-life.
The essential function that the tradition of Western philosophy has assigned to the
contemplative life and to inoperativity: form-of-life, the properly human life is the one
that, by rendering inoperative the specific works and functions of the living being, causes
them to idle,... so to speak, and in this way opens them into possibility. Contemplation
and inoperativity are in this sense the metaphysical operators of an anthropogenesis,
which, in liberating living human beings from every biological and social destiny and
every predetermined task, render tham available for that peculiar absence of work that we
are accustomed to calling ‘politics’ and ‘art.’ Politics and art are not tasks nor simply
‘works’: rather, they name the dimension in which works—linguistic and bodily, material
and immaterial, biological and social—are deactivated and contemplated as such in order
to liberate the inoperative that has remained imprisoned in them (pg. 1278)
While inoperativity and use are likely to be difficult concepts to translate into
mainstream conversations in the education sphere, contemplation is at least a concept that
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most individuals understand has something to do with reflection and the use of leisure
time, even if that understanding is not fully aligned with all the resonances it has in
Agamben’s work.
A great starting point and next step for thinking through the distinction between
operative and inoperative practices might be to analyze “The Tree of Contemplative
Practices'' (Figure 1) which has branches that we already associate with education and
schooling in some respect or another—reading, music, arts, storytelling, listening, and
dialogue.

Figure 1

The tree of contemplative practices

When thinking practically, an obvious starting point in response to this work is to
recognize that focus in schools might be thorough training of students on how to read
closely, annotate a text, take notes, summarize passages, identify central ideas, write
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good questions, and hold meaningful discussions. A well researched approach to doing
this is given by Mary Keator (2018) in Lectio Divina as Contemplative Pedagogy:
Reappropriating Monastic Practices for the Humanities. While Keator is not the only
researcher taking seriously the need for a stronger focus on study through contemplation,
her work is exemplary in putting forward a clear pedagogy and set of practices, at least
within the humanities, that makes contemplation a meaningful experience in classrooms.
Additionally, Sean Steel (2015), leaning into the philosophers of antiquity in The
Pursuit of Wisdom in Education, presents a strong case for educators to turn away from
practices that focus on material gain and, instead, present the classroom as a space where
wisdom might be more of a concern to the educational experience than knowledge
acquisition. While wisdom is a sticky concept that can and should be analyzed and
critiqued, the greater effort put forward by Steel suggests that there is a needed
transformation toward contemplation and leisurely, exploratory reading rather than
curricular coverage.
Again, it cannot be forgotten that inoperativity and form-of-life are new concepts
within education scholarship and there should be pause before rushing into new
pedagogical approaches. But what is promising when thinking about contemplative
practices as foundational to the classroom is that they would not require teachers to
outright transgress state mandates and common core standards.
More important at this point than thinking about new or alternative pedagogies is
to begin thinking about what kind of changes might need to happen in teacher education
programs, moving away from operative practices and toward the inoperative. If it is true
that we live-from (Levinas, 1969) study, reading, creative endeavors as a way of living
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that holds these activities as means unto themselves, then we should give prospective
educators an education that aligns with this basic principle. We should want educators to
spend more time not thinking about what an educator is, but how an educator becomes an
educator. My objective is to develop a resilient theory of education and approach to
schooling that might allow us to undo the harm that current operative practices inflict on
students, and that work has to start with educators, not with students. When we put the
above objectives in a form-of-life framework rather than a framework of competition and
achievement, school and classroom practices will necessarily change. And though things
will likely remain mostly the same, that little bit of difference, in its own way, is a
difference with major implications.
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